

Message Text

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21

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

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P R 131000Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2797

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

AMCONSUL ADANA

AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

AMCONSUL IZMIR

USMISSION USNATO

DIRNSA WASHDC

CINCEUR

CINCAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON

COMSIXTHFLEET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 1993

EXDIS

MILITARY ADEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, MASS, PFOR, TU

SUBJ: DISCUSSION WITH FONMIN ON REACTIVATING US
INSTALLATIONS

REF: A. ANKARA 1938 DTG 111510Z MAR 76, B. 75 ANKARA 7857

DTG 202304Z OCT 75

1. I CALLED ON FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL AFTERNOON FRIDAY,
MARCH 12, PRIMARILY TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF THE TIMING
TF THE REACTIVATION OF U.S. INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY IF
A NEW SECURITY AGREEMENT IS SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED LATER THIS
MONTH.

2. AFTER USUAL EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES, I EXPRESSED
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MY CONCERN OVER COMMENTS BY TURKISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

INDICATING THAT RUEKEY MAY HAVE IN MIND PERMITTING U.S. FACILITIES TO BE STARTED UP NOT RPT NOT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SIGNING OF AN AGREEMENT BUT ONLY AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS ENDORSED BY CONGRESS. I RECALLED THAT LAST OCTOBER 20, WHEN THE FONMIN AND DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT OF REACTIVATION (REF B), I HAD SPOKEN OF PRESIDENT'S FORD'S WISH THAT THE FACILITIES BE STARTED UP AT ONCE IN RECOGNITION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION OF LAST OCTOBER 2. I HAD SPOKEN THEN OF THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS OF MORALE AND MANAGEMENT CAUSED BY THE ALREADY LENGTHY STOPPAGE OF ACTIVITIES. I FURTHER RECALLED THAT THE FONMIN HAD SAID AT THAT TIME THAT THE TURKISH NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THESE SERIOUS U.S. CONSIDERATIONS BUT HAD RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDED IT WAS NOT RPT NOT POSSIBLE TO START UP AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER, THE FONMIN HAD ASSURED ME THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD SET A TARGET FOR ITSELF WHICH WAS TO CONCLUDE THE FIRST ESSENTIAL PORTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN 45 DAYS, AND THAT IF WE WERE ABLE TO PRODUCE AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON BASIC ISSUES, WE COULD THEN PROMPTLY REACTIVATE THE BASES, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE MORE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT COULD BE SETTLED IN A LATER STAGE. I EMPHASIZED THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF THE UNDERSTANDING GIVEN US BY THE FONMIN AT THAT TIME.

3. CAGLAYANGIL SAID THAT MFA SEC GEN ELEKDAG HAD REPORTED HIS AND MY CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT THE PREVIOUS DAY (REFA) CAGLAYANGIL THEN BEGAN HIS RESPONSE BY ADDING BACKGROUND TO HIS STATEMENT OF LAST OCTOBER. HE RECALLED THAT WHEN I HAD URGED HIM AT THAT TIME TO TAKE NOTE OF THE ENCOURAGING GESTURE BY CONGRESS IN PARTIALLY LIFTING THE EMBARGO, HE HAD REPLIED THAT THE GOT HAD EARLIER SHOWN GREAT PATIENCE IN DEALING WITH THE EMBARGO AND HAD ONLY TAKEN ACTION WHEN THE EMBARGO POSITION WAS REITERATED IN JULY. AFTER THAT ACTION, THE LEGAL BASIS FOR OUR DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP DISAPPEARED AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEEK A NEW BASIS. HE RECALLED THAT I HAD POINTED OUT THAT NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT TAKE A LONG TIME AND THAT THIS SITUATION WAS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF EITHER OF US. IN RESPONSE HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT TIMETABLE OF 45 DAYS, HIS CONCEPT BEING CONFIDENTIAL

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THAT WORK SHOULD BE CARRIED ON AT AN ACCELERATED PACE TO FINISH A BASIC AGREEMENT, LEAVING TECHNICAL DETAILS FOR THE LATER STAGE. UNFORTUNATELY, HE SAID, THE RESULTS HAD BEEN CONTRARY TO HIS EXPECTATIONS; THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY CONCLUDED BUT THE MAJOR ISSUES ARE STILL UNSETTLED.

4. THE FONMIN THEN POINTED OUT THAT THE TURKISH DECISION

TO CLOSE DOWN THE FACILITIES HAD BEEN TAKEN THROUGH A PROCESS INVOLVING EXAMINATION OF THE EMBARGO SITUATION BY THE TURKISH NSC, A DECISION BY THE NSC TO RECOMMEND SUSPENSION OF THE ACTIVITIES AT THE FACILITIES, DISCUSSION WITHIN THE CABINET, AND FINALLY, A CABINET DECISION TO CLOSE DOWN THE FACILITIES. HE COULD NOT NOW ACT ON HIS OWN. THE SAME PROCEDURES, HE SAID, MUST BE FOLLOWED TO REACTIVATE THE INSTALLATIONS.

5. CAGLAYANGIL NEXT NOTED THAT WHEN HE HAD GONE TO THE NSC TO SUGGEST THAT NEGOTIATIONS BE STARTED, HE HAD BEEN QUERIED ON THE GROUNDS THAT SINCE THE EMBARGO REMAINED IN EFFECT, HOW COULD NEGOTIATIONS BE STARTED? HE SAID HE HAD TRIED TO CONVINCE THE NSC THAT THE GESTURE BY CONGRESS IN PARTIALLY LIFTING THE EMBARGO SHOULD BE RECIPROCATED. HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS PRESUMABLY WOULD TAKE SOME TIME, REMOVAL OF THE REMAINING RESTRICTIONS COULD BE EXPECTED IN THE INTERIM. I INTERRUPTED TO ASK WHETHER HE HAD EXPECTED THE RESTRICTIONS TO BE LIFTED IN THE 45-DAY PERIOD HE HAD EARLIER MENTIONED, NOTING THAT THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN UNREALISTIC. HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT HELD SUCH AN EXPECTATION, BUT THAT WE WERE NOW FACED WITH A NEW SITUATION--A REFERENCE TO RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS REAFFIRMING SIGNIFICANT PORTIONS OF THE EMBARGO.

6. RECAPITULATING, CAGLAYANGIL SAID THAT THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT WERE ALMOST COMPLETED, DEFENSE SUPPORT MATTERS COULD BE SETTLED BY HIMSELF AND THE SECRETARY, AND THE NEWLY PASSED HOUSE BILL DESPITE ITS DEFECTS SHOWS PROGRESS ON THE CONGRESSIONAL FRONT. HE ADDED THAT FINAL RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE GOT CABINET--INCLUDING AUTHORIZING THE REACTIVATION OF

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THE FACILITIES--WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN A MONTH'S TIME AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT--"OR EVEN IN A WEEK'S TIME." HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE ARGUMENT THAT REACTIVATION OF THE FACILITIES WOULD "CREATE A GOOD ATMOSPHERE" FOR FAVORABLE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. BUT, HE SAID, AT THE SAME TIME HE WOULD HAVE TO EXPLAIN TO THE GOT THAT IF THE DOCUMENT WERE NOT ENDORSED BY CONGRESS, TURKEY WOULD BE FREE TO SUSPEND THE FACILITIES AGAIN. THIS WOULD BE ILLOGICAL. INSTEAD, HE URGED, THE U.S. SHOULD PUT PRESSURE NOT ON THE GOT BUT ON CONGRESS. SINCE THE GOT COULD RATIFY THE AGREEMENT IN "A WEEK OR TWO" AFTER SIGNING WHY NOT ASK CONGRESS TO WORK WITH THE SAME PRIORITY TO INSURE THAT THE INSTALLATIONS COULD BE REOPENED? HE ALSO ASKED THAT WE BEAR IN MIND THAT IF THE INSTALLATIONS WERE REOPENED IMMEDIATELY AFTER SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT,

HE WOULD BE ASKED WHY TURKEY HAD RELAXED ITS
PRESSURE WHEN CONGRESS HAS NOT APPROVED THE LIFTING OF
THE EMBARGO AND TURKEY CANNOT EVEN YET GET CREDIT SALES.

7. IN RESPONSE I EMPHASIZED THE COUNTER LOGIC OF THE
U.S. POSITION. THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE U.S.
TAKES TIME. CONGRESS CANNOT DROP EVERYTHING TO
DEAL WITH A NEW AGREEMENT WITH TURKEY. THE SPANISH
TREATY IS PRESENTLY BEFORE IT ALONG WITH MANY OTHER
IMPORTANT ITEMS OF LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS. EVEN AT A
FAST PACE THEREFORE, CONGRESSIONAL ENDORSEMENT WILL
TAKE SOME TIME. MEANSHILE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE IDLE PEOPLE
AND IDLE FACILITIES, AS WE HAVE HAD FOR MANY MONTHS. QUITE
APART FROM THE INCREASINGLY UNACCEPTABLE BUDGETARY
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS, WE HAD REACHED A POINT WHERE MANY
MILITARY COMMANDERS HAD CONCLUDED THAT DETERIORATING
MORALE AND MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS CANNOT BE PERMITTED
TO CONTINUE.

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ACTION SS-25

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----- 130531

P R 131000Z MAR 76
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2798
INF SECDEF WAHSDC
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
USMISSION USNATO
DIRNSA WASHDC
CINCEUR
CINCAREUR
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON
COMSIXTHFLEET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 1993

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8. IF THE FACILITIES ARE STARTED UP, I SAID, CONGRESS WILL UNDERSTAND THAT IF IT REFUSES TO ENDORSE THE AGREEMENT, OR IF IT ALTERS THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, THE FACILITIES WILL BE CLOSED DOWN AND LIQUIDATED. BUT IF THERE HAS BEEN NO START UP BY THE TIME THE AGREEMENT IS SENT TO CONGRESS, ENDLESS AMENDMENTS WILL BE OFFERED BY CONGRESSMEN. NEW LANGUAGE WILL EMERGE, NEW NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE NECESSARY, AND THE GOT MAY WELL HAVE CREATED A NEW SITUATION IN WHICH IT FINDS THAT IT HAS INSERTED THE CONGRESS DIRECTLY INTO A NEW AND MUCH PROLONGED NEGOTIATING PROCESS. INSTEAD, I ARGUED, THE GOT SHOULD TAKE THE PUBLIC POSITION THAT THE FACILITIES WERE BEING REOPENED IN THE COMMON DEFENSE, CONFIDENTIAL

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AND THAT TURKEY'S INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED BECAUSE THE FACILITIES COULD BE CLOSED IF CONGRESS DID NOT ENDORSE THE AGREEMENT.

9. I ALSO SAID THAT I COULD MORE READILY SEE THE FONMIN'S LOGIC IF CONGRESS WERE ONLY GOING TO HAVE TO CONSIDER THE AGREEMENT ONCE. BUT THROUGH THE ANNUAL APPROPRIATION CYCLE, CONGRESS WILL HAVE TO RECONSIDER ITS OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT EVERY YEAR OF ITS DURATION. FINALLY I AGAIN NOTED MY CONCERN OVER THE GOT'S CHANGING THE GROUND RULES IN THE MIDDLE OF OUR EFFORT. THESE HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO US IN THE OCTOBER 20 MEETING AND I EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT WE HAD BEEN RELYING ON THEM.

10. FOR ALL THESE REASONS I URGED THAT THE GOT AGREE TO STARTING UP THE FACILITIES IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT. AT A MINIMUM I RECOMMENDED THAT HE AND HIS GOT COLLEAGUES REMAIN FLEXIBLE ON THIS ISSUE SO THAT HE AND THE SECRETARY COULD DISCUSS IT FURTHER DURING THEIR WASHINGTON DELIBERATIONS.

11. THE FONMIN ASSURED ME THAT HE FULLY APPRECIATED THE ARGUMENTS FAVORING REACTIVATING THE FACILITIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, HIS GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO SAVE THE AGREEMENT AND SAVE U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS AND HE ASSERTED IT WOULD BE TAKING A GREATER RISK IF IT ACCEDED TO THE U.S. REQUEST FOR AN IMMEDIATE REACTIVATION. HE AGAIN ASKED THAT THE U.S. SEEK TO ACCELERATE CONGRESSIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF THE AGREEMENT. HE WENT ON THEN TO CITE STILL ANOTHER CONSIDERATION, WHICH WAS THAT ONCE

THE FACILITIES WERE REACTIVATED, CONGRESS WOULD BECOME "NONCHALANT" AND THE ENDORSEMENT PROCESS WOULD BE SLOWED DOWN. THE GREEK LOBBY, HE SAID, WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS SLOWDOWN TO TRY TO INFLUENCE CONGRESS FIRST TO DELAY AND THEN TO CHHANGE THE AGREEMENT, AND FINALLY TO REFUST IT. IF THIS HAPPENED AND IF REACTIVATED INSTALLATIONS WERE AS A RESULT AGAIN SHUT DOWN, WE WOULD HAVE NO RELATIONS TO SAVE BECAUSE THEY WOULD BE DAMAGED IRREPARABLY. TURKEY WOULD BE COMPELLED TO "LIQUIDATE AND TERMINATE." THE GOT DID NOT WANT SUCH A SITUATION TO OCCUR. THE BEST MEANS OF PREVENTING IT, HE BELIEVED, CONFIDENTIAL

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WAS FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO ACT SIMULATENOUSLY TO RATIFY THE AGREEMENT AND PUT IT INTO EFFECT.

12. RETURNING TO A CENTRAL GOT PREOCCUPATION, CAGLAYANGI NEXT SAID IT MUST BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT SO LONG AS CONGRESS DOES NOT SEPARATE THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE ISSUE FROM THE CYPRUS ISSUE, NO ONE SHOULD EXPECT FROM MAKARIOS OR THE GREEK GOVERNMENT ANY STEP TOWARD SOLVING THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. IN THE PRESENT CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION, HE BELIEVED MAKARIOS SEES NO PURPOSE IN AGREEING WITH TURKEY ON THE BASIS OF A BI-ZONAL FEDERATION.

13. I EMPAHSIZED THAT THE U.S., TOO, WAS SEEKING TO FOLLOW A COURSE WHICH WAS BEST CALCULATED TO MINIMIZE FURTHER RISK OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. CENTRAL TO THIS EFFORT MUST BE THE GETTING OF CONGRESS ON BOARD. AN IMMEDIATE START-UP ON SIGNING WAS BEST CALCULATED, IN THE U.S. VIEW, TO ACHIEVE THIS. IF THE GOT WAS DETERMINED TO FOLLOW A DIFFERENT COURSE IT MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IT WAS IN OUR JUDGMENT DIMINISHING THE ODDS WE COULD REACH OUR COMMON GOAL. GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE I URGED THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD BECOME "DUG-IN" ON IT AT THIS POINT AND THAT IT BE LEFT OPEN FOR DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON.

14. CAGLAYANGIL RESPONDED THAT HE WAS NOT AT THIS TIME EXPRESSING A FINAL POSITION ON THE SUBJECT. HE PROMISED TO REPORT MY VIEWS TO HIS GOVERNMENT COLLEAGUES WHO WOULD COLLECTIVEY HAVE TO MAKE THE DECISION.

15. I THEN RAISED THREE OTHER SUBJECTS: (1) REOPENING APO PACKAGE SERVICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE; (2) LIFTING THE RESTRICTIONS ON SALES OF CARS AND HOUSEHOLD ITEMS AMONG OUR MILITARY PERSONNEL; AND (3) THE DIFFICULTIES WE WE WERE HAVING IN GETTING THE EMBASSY'S DIPLOMATIC

LICENSE PLATES EXCHANGED--FOR SECURITY REASONS--FOR
NORMAL LICENSE PLATES. THE FONMIN SAID HE WOULD TRY
TO BE HELPFUL IN EACH OF THESE AREAS.

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16 COMMENT: REGRETTABLY, BUT CLEARLY,
CAGLAYANGIL HAS FIRMLY SHIFTED HIS POSITION ON THE START-UP
ISSUE FROM THE ONE HE OFFICIALLY PRESENTED IN OUR
OCTOBER 20 CONVERSATION. IT IS NOW MOST UNLIKELY THAT
THE GOT WILL AGREE TO A START-UP IMMEDIATELY AFTER AN
AGREEMENT IS SIGNED. THIS IN PART IS THE RESULT OF
TURK ANGER FOLLOWING RECENT CONGRESSIONAL REAFFIRMATIONS
OF CERTAIN OF ITS INITIAL PUNITIVE MEASURES--AS WELL
AS CONGRESSIONAL ADDING OF WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE
RE TURK IMMIGRATION TO THE ISLAND. IN PART IT REFLECTS
CONCERN OVER NOT HANDING AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL WEAPON
OVER TO ERBAKAN AND TO THE OPPOSITION. AND FINALLY, IT
FLOWS IN PART FROM THE LOGIC OF CERTAIN OF THE TACTICAL
CONCERNS CAGLAYANGIL SET FORTH. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN
TERMS OF BOTH CONGRESSIONAL TACTICS AND THE INCREASINGLY
STRAINED BUDGETARY AND MORALE SITUATION ON THE INSTAL-
LATIONS, THERE IS A COMPELLING LOGIC IN OUR POSITION.
I BELIEVE THAT THE BEST WE CAN HOPE TO DO FOR THE TIME BEING
IS TO PRESERVE A MODICUM OF TURKISH FLEXIBILITY ON
THIS ISSUE PENDING CAGLAYANGIL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON.
THAT WAS MY OBJECTIVE IN THIS CONVERSATION, BUT
I AM NOT SANGUINE ABOUT THE RESULT.
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